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The present study investigated prospective cognition with the Hope scale (Snyder et al.,
1991) and the Unrealistic Optimism Scale (Weinstein, 1980) in clinically depressed (CD;
n = 61), previously depressed (PD; n = 42), and never depressed controls (ND; n = 46). In
line with previous research, significant negative correlations between hope and symptoms
of depression were found. Previously depressed reported lower levels of hope than
NDs, but were more hopeful than CDs. In addition, relationships between depressive
symptoms, dysfunctional attitudes, and expectations for the future were examined. As
hypothesized, the CDs estimated their probability of experiencing positive events in the
future as lower and their probability of experiencing negative events as higher than the
two other groups. The PDs differed not from the NDs in their probability estimates.
Implications of the findings are discussed.
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Conceptualizations of depression often include an emphasis on
the role of negative future-oriented cognitions. For example,
hopelessness about the future is central in cognitive accounts
of depression (e.g., Beck et al., 1979; Abramson et al., 1989).
Beck (1976) has suggested that depression is characterized by a
negative cognitive triad consisting of negative views of the self,
the personal world, and the future. Also, Beck suggested that
depression prone individuals are characterized by negative self-
schemas, containing dysfunctional attitudes, frequently assessed
with the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman and Beck,
1978). The DAS includes core beliefs such as that one’s hap-
piness depends on being perfect or on other people’s approval
(de Graaf et al., 2009). Abramson et al. (1989) reformulated the
revised learned helplessness theory in terms of hopelessness and
proposed that depression-prone individuals attribute negative life
events to internal, stable, and global causes. Alloy and Ahrens
(1987) demonstrated that a depressogenic attribution style is
associated with pessimism regarding the future.
Several studies have examined prospective cognition in depres-
sion and found reduced positive expectations in this group.
For example, using a verbal fluency paradigm, MacLeod et al.
(1997b) found that depressed individuals generated significantly
fewer positive events than anxious and controls. There were
no group differences in a verbal fluency control task, making
it unlikely that the cognitive deficits often found in depressed
patients can explain this result. Recently, this finding has been
replicated in mild to moderate depressed outpatients (Bjärehed
et al., 2010). The effect is probably due to difficulties in assessing
mental representations of positive future experiences (MacLeod
and Salaminiou, 2001). Furthermore, mental images of positive
prospective events of depressed individuals are characterized by
lower vividness (Morina et al., 2011).
Hope and optimism are overlapping, but distinguishable
future-oriented constructs that have received considerable atten-
tion in the psychological literature (Alarcon et al., 2013). Snyder
(1995) ties hopeful thinking expressly to goals and regards goal-
directed thoughts as the basic building blocks for human learning
and coping. According to Snyder (1995), goal-directed cognitions
include the cognitive willpower or energy to get moving toward
one’s goal (the agency component) and the perceived ability to
generate routes to get to a goal (the pathway component). He sug-
gests that both the agentic and pathway goal-related thoughts are
necessary to yield hope and that blockage to either pathway or
agency thought may have an impact on coping. Both the agency
and pathways components have been found to be negatively cor-
related with depression (e.g., Chang, 2003). Furthermore, hope
has been found to moderate the effects of, for example, rumina-
tion and negative life events on depressive symptoms (Geiger and
Kwon, 2010; Visser et al., 2013). However, only the agency compo-
nent had a unique effect on later depression in a study conducted
by Arnau et al. (2007).
Optimism has been shown to be beneficial for mental and
physical health (Peterson, 2000). Unrealistic optimism refers to an
overestimation of the likelihood of experiencing positive events
in the future and an underestimation of the probability of expe-
riencing negative events as to compared to others (Weinstein and
Klein, 1996; Sharot, 2011). A number of studies have supported
the presence of unrealistic optimism in normal, healthy individ-
uals (e.g., Weinstein, 1980, 1987; Harris and Middleton, 1994;
Campbell et al., 2007). For example, Weinstein (1980) found col-
lege students to rate their own chances, as opposed to classmates,
to be above average for positive events and below average for neg-
ative events. A possible explanation of the mechanism responsible
for the unrealistic optimism phenomena may be the illusion of
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control. This suggestion was actually supported by Harris and
Middleton (1994) who found the unrealistic optimism to be asso-
ciated with the perceived controllability of the negative event.
Overly optimistic beliefs have been suggested to be important for
mental and physical health (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Taylor et al.,
2000). In contrast to hope, optimism is considered a personal-
ity trait. According to the five-factor model (Costa and McCrae,
1992), optimism is a trait of extraversion. Studies have confirmed
the strong relationship with extraversion (Sharpe et al., 2011) and
shown that optimism has higher correlations with personality
traits than hope (Alarcon et al., 2013).
Research on subjective probability judgments has demon-
strated that people with anxiety and depression differ from
normal, healthy individuals. They tend to judge negative future
events as more likely to happen to them than to others (Butler
and Mathews, 1983; MacLeod and Cropley, 1995; MacLeod et al.,
1997b). Also, mood-disturbed individuals have been found to
judge positive future events as less likely to happen to them
than to others (Pyszczynski et al., 1987; MacLeod and Cropley,
1995; MacLeod et al., 1997b). Furthermore, the positivity bias
commonly found in healthy individuals is attenuated in mood-
disturbed individuals (Moore and Fresco, 2012). Recently, inter-
ventions have been developed that aim to enhance positive
expectations in depressed individuals (Vilhauer et al., 2012).
However, little is known about hope and optimism in individ-
uals who have recovered from depression. Therefore, the purpose
of the present study is to explore and compare hope and unre-
alistic optimism in never depressed, previously depressed, and
clinically depressed individuals. Due to the previous experience
of losing control (i.e., the depressive breakdown) it is expected
that the unrealistic optimism about future events observed in
normal, healthy individuals would not be present to the same
degree in formerly depressed individuals. Also, we wanted to
explore the relationship between dysfunctional attitudes and hope




The current investigation is part of a research project on cogni-
tive vulnerability for depression (Wang, 2006). Participants were
149 subjects, 122 women and 27 mens, aged 18–54 (M = 28.6,
SD = 10). The recruitment and diagnosis procedures have been
described in detail in Wang et al. (2005). In brief, participants
were recruited among undergraduate students and patients con-
sulting their general practitioner and screened with the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1979) and the Previous
Depression Questionnaire (PDQ; Wang, 1996). Out of about 340
students and 180 patients who returned the questionnaires and
were willing to take part in the study, 184 subjects (84 patients
and 100 students) were invited to participate. These individuals
had a BDI score above 16 (clinically depressed) or had a lower
score, but met the requirements for previous depression on the
PDQ. In addition, a sample was randomly drawn from those
who had a BDI score in the normal range (between 0 and 9)
and did not report previous depression on the PDQ. Participants
were diagnosed using the mood disorder and psychotic symptoms
sections of the SCID I (First et al., 1997). Individuals were
excluded if the diagnostic criteria for a current or previous depres-
sive episode were not met, the depressive episode was more than
five years ago, or psychotic or hypomanic symptoms were present
(N = 30). Additional five individuals dropped out before study
completion. The final sample consisted of 61 clinically depressed
(CD; 52 women and 9 men; M = 30.8 years, SD = 10), 42 pre-
viously depressed (PD; 35 women and 7 men; M = 27.0 years,
SD = 8) and 46 never depressed controls (ND; 35 women and 11
men; M = 26.9 years, SD = 9).
MEASURES
Dysphoric symptoms
Dysphoric symptoms were measured with the BDI (Beck et al.,
1979), which is a widely used 21-item self-report symptom scale
that assesses a variety of affective, behavioral, cognitive, and
somatic symptoms indicating dysphoric states or clinical depres-
sion. For each item, there are four alternative statements, which
reflect increasing levels of severity. Possible scores range from 0
to 63. Psychometric properties of the BDI have been provided by
Beck et al. (1988).
Dysfunctional attitudes
Dysfunctional attitudes were assessed with the Dysfunctional
Attitude Scale (Form A) (DAS; Weissman and Beck, 1978). The
DAS is a 40-item self-report inventory designed to measure the
presence of dysfunctional attitudes. The content of these state-
ments concern need for approval, perfectionism, and rigid ideas
about the world. Items are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from
“totally agree” to “totally disagree.”
Hope Scale
The Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) is a 12-item self-report scale
designed to measure dispositional hope. The scale exists of four
items tapping agency for goals, four items measuring pathways
for goals, and four distracters. Each of the twelve items is rated
according to a Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 (definitely
false) to 4 (definitely true). The total score is the sum of the
agency and pathways items scores. Snyder et al. (1991) report
that the Hope Scale has adequate internal and test-retest relia-
bility. In addition, support for a two-factor model of the scale
with the agency and pathways components has been found in
confirmatory factor analyses (Babyak et al., 1993).
Unrealistic Optimism Scale
The Unrealistic Optimism Scale (UOS; Weinstein, 1980) is an
84-item self-report scale designed to measure unrealistic opti-
mism for future events. The UOS consists of 18 positive and
24 negative events. The 42 positive and negative items are rated
twice. First, with the instruction: “Please, try to estimate in per-
cent (between 0 and 100%) how probable it is that the following
events will happen to you?” And second with the instruction:
“Please, try to estimate in percent (between 0 and 100%) how
probable it is that the following events will happen to a person
of the same sex as you?”. Examples of positive and negative UOS
items are “Not ill all winter” and “Tripping and breaking bone”.
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RESULTS
As reported previously (Wang et al., 2005), there were signifi-
cant differences between the CDs, PDs, and NDs with respect to
dysphoric symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes.
Means and standard deviations of the Hope and UOS
scales in the three groups are shown in Table 1. To deter-
mine whether the three groups of participants differed with
respect to hope and estimated probability for future events, sep-
arate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed.
Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant for the
hope total score (p < 0.001), hope agency (p < 0.01), hope path-
ways (p < 0.01), and estimation of the probability that others
will experience positive events (p < 0.05). Following the recom-
mendation by Field (2009), the Welch F-ratio is reported for
these variables. Post-hoc comparisons were conducted using the
Games-Howell test.
These analyses yielded a significant effect for group on the total
hope score, F(2, 94.98) = 38.90, p < 0.001, on the hope agency,
F(2, 95.31) = 31.24, p < 0.001, and on the hope pathways scales,
F(2, 93.67) = 29.94, p < 0.001. Post-hoc tests indicate that all three
groups differed significantly from each other on all three hope
measures (all ps < 0.01). The clinically depressed reported less
hope than the previously depressed who again had lower scores
on the hope scales than the never depressed.
Clinically depressed, previously depressed, and never
depressed controls differed significantly in their estimates of their
own and others probability of experiencing positive events in the
future, F(2, 146) = 6.39, p < 0.01 and F(2, 96.96) = 3.17, p < 0.05,
respectively. The three groups also differed significantly in their
estimates of their own probability of experiencing negative events
in the future, F(2, 146) = 6.35, p < 0.01, but not the probability
of others, F(2, 145) = 0.25, p = 0.779.
The clinically depressed estimated their probability of experi-
encing positive events in the future as lower and their probability
of experiencing negative events as higher than the previously
depressed and never depressed. Post-hoc comparisons showed sig-
nificant differences between the CDs and PDs (p < 0.05) and
NDs (p < 0.01), but not between the last two groups. With
respect to estimates of the probability that others will experience
positive events in the future, there was a significant difference
between the CDs and NDs (p < 0.05).
To further investigate the relationships of depression with
dysfunctional attitudes, hope, probability estimates of future
events, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with the BDI
as the dependent variable. The results indicated that the pre-
dictors explained 55.3% of the variance [F(7, 139) = 24.55, p <
0.001]. Individual significant predictors were dysfunctional atti-
tudes (β = 0.27, p < 0.001), hope agency (β = −0.24, p < 0.01),
and estimates of others probability of experiencing positive events
in the future (β = 0.16, p < 0.05).
T-tests within each group showed that participants in all three
groups estimated their own probability to experience positive
life events as higher than their probability to experience neg-
ative life events [ND: t(45) = 9.30, p < 0.001; PD: t(41) = 6.92,
p < 0.001; CD: t(60) = 2.27, p < 0.05]. Further, participants in
all three groups estimated another person’s probability to experi-
ence positive events as higher than their probability to experience
negative events [ND: t(45) = 5.58, p < 0.001; PD: t(41) = 7.29,
p < 0.001; CD: t(59) = 8.04, p < 0.001]. Finally, NDs estimated
that their own probability for experiencing positive events in
the future is higher than for others [t(45) = 2.77, p < 0.01],
while CDs estimated that another person’s probability is higher
than their own [t(60) = −4.05, p < 0.001]. No significant differ-
ence was obtained for the PDs [t(41) = 0.64, p = 0.527]. With
respect to negative events, NDs estimated their own probabil-
ity as less than for another person [t(45) = −2.77, p < 0.01],
while CDs estimated another person’s probability as less than
their own probability [t(59) = 2.52, p < 0.05]. Again, no sig-
nificant difference was obtained for the PDs [t(41) = −0.22,
p = 0.825].
Correlations between the BDI, DAS, Hope scales, and UOS
scales in the total sample are displayed in Table 2. Dysphoric
symptoms and dysfunctional attitudes were highly and negatively
correlated with the three hope scales. The BDI and DAS scores
were negatively related to estimates of one’s own probability of
experiencing positive events, but positively to estimates of one’s
own probability of experiencing negative events and others prob-
ability of experiencing positive events. There were no significant
Table 1 | Means and standard deviations of Hope and UOS scales in clinically depressed, previously depressed and never depressed.
Never depressed Previously depressed Clinically depressed
M SD M SD M SD
Hopetotal 3.14 0.32 2.85 0.38 2.43 0.52
Hopeagency 3.12 0.35 2.84 0.41 2.41 0.58
Hopepathways 3.17 0.38 2.86 0.49 2.45 0.58
UOSown probability of pos. events 42.19 12.80 39.44 10.49 33.87 13.07
UOSown probability of neg. events 21.56 9.37 22.75 10.71 28.70 12.68
UOSothers probability of pos. events 36.88 11.93 38.16 10.46 43.58 16.58
UOSothers probability of neg. events 24.73 11.08 23.08 13.03 24.81 14.50
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. UOSown probability of pos. events ,estimate of own probability of experiencing positive events in the future; UOSown probability of neg. events , estimate
of own probability of experiencing negative events in the future; UOSothers probability of pos. events , estimate of others probability of experiencing positive events in the
future; UOSothers probability of neg. events , estimate of others probability of experiencing negative events in the future.
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correlations between dysphoric symptoms and dysfunctional atti-
tudes and estimates of others probability of experiencing neg-
ative events in the future. Correlations between the three hope
variables and four UOS scales are also shown in Table 2. The
hope scales showed a reverse pattern of relations with prob-
ability estimates of future events as dysphoric symptoms and
dysfunctional attitudes. However, there was a small, but signif-
icant positive correlation between hope pathways and estimates
of others probability of experiencing negative events. To check
whether depressive symptoms account for the high number of
significant associations, correlational analyses were rerun control-
ling for BDI scores. Results showed generally reduced correlation
coefficients. Associations between the DAS and UOS scales were
no longer significant at the 5% level. Except for a positive correla-
tion between hope pathways and estimates of others probability of
negative events, the Hope Scales were only significantly and posi-
tively related to estimates of own probability of positive events in
the future.
DISCUSSION
This study was conducted to explore and compare prospec-
tive cognitions (i.e., hope and probability estimates of future
events) of never depressed (ND), previously depressed (PD), and
clinically depressed (CD) individuals.
Correlational analyses for the total sample showed signifi-
cant relationships between dysphoric symptoms, dysfunctional
attitudes, hope, and probability estimates of future events, indi-
cating substantial connections between these concepts. When
controlled for depression severity, however, dysfunctional atti-
tudes were solely associated with low levels of hope, but not
probability estimates of future events. Hope was correlated with
higher probability estimates of experiencing positive events in the
future.
A multiple regression analysis showed that approximately 55%
of the variance in depressive symptoms as measured by the BDI is
explained by dysfunctional attitudes, hope, and probability esti-
mates of future events. This finding underscores the importance
of cognitions for the understanding of depression, dysfunctional
attitudes and agency in particular.
Comparing the three groups, the results with respect to the
NDs and the CDs mainly replicate previous findings reviewed
above. Significant negative associations between Snyder et al.’s
(1991) conceptualization of hope and depressive symptoms have
been found (cf. Chang, 2003). In terms of the agency and path-
ways components of hope, the cognitive willpower or energy to
get moving toward one’s goal (hope agency) and perceived abil-
ity to generate routes to get somewhere (hope pathways) were
significantly reduced in CDs compared to NDs. Furthermore,
both the NDs and the CDs expected that more positive than
negative events would happen to them. However, there were
differences between the NDs and the CDs in the expectation
of positive and negative events. In line with previous findings
(e.g., MacLeod et al., 1997a), the CDs estimated the proba-
bility of experiencing positive events in the future as lower as
the NDs, and they judged the probability of experiencing neg-
ative events as higher as the NDs. They also expected that
positive events are more likely to happen to others than the
NDs did.
The main purpose of the present study was, however, to add to
the understanding of hope and optimism in previously depressed
individuals. With regard to hope, as measured with the Hope
Scale, the PDs fell just between the NDs and the CDs on the
two components of hope. They showed higher scores on hope
agency and hope pathways than the CD group, but lower scores
than the ND group. With respect to expectations for the future
they differed from the CDs, but not the NDs. In other words,
they estimated their own and others probability of experienc-
ing positive and negative events in the future in the same way as
the NDs. Accordingly, PDs were able to form positive prospective
cognitions to the same degree, as did the NDs.
These findings contribute to a better understanding of
prospective cognitions in previously depressed individuals, but
also have clinical implications. The results suggest that recovery
from depression is not necessarily accompanied by the restoration
of normal levels of hope. Both the agency and pathways compo-
nents of hope were reduced in previously depressed compared to
normal controls, making them possibly vulnerable to new depres-
sive episodes. As a consequence, treatments for depression should
Table 2 | Correlations between the BDI, DAS, UOS, and Hope Scale in the total sample.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. BDI –
2. DAS 0.60** –
3. Hopetotal −0.65** −0.60** –
4. Hopeagency −0.59** −0.48** 0.91** –
5. Hopepathways −0.60** −0.62** 0.92** 0.67** –
6. UOSown probability of pos. events −0.34** −0.20* 0.46** 0.46** 0.39** –
7. UOSown probability of neg. events 0.37** 0.31** −0.26** −0.26** −0.22** −0.05 –
8. UOSothers probability of pos. events 0.32** 0.22** −0.20* −0.17* −0.19* 0.20* 0.41** –
9. UOSothers probability of neg. events 0.06 −0.03 0.09 −0.01 0.17* 0.22** 0.66** 0.30** –
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. UOSown probability of pos. events , estimate of own probability of experiencing positive events in the future; UOSown probability of neg. events , estimate
of own probability of experiencing negative events in the future; UOSothers probability of pos. events , estimate of others probability of experiencing positive events in the
future; UOSothers probability of neg. events , estimate of others probability of experiencing negative events in the future.
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include a focus on the patients’ goal-directed determination (the
agency component of hope) and their ability to find ways to meet
their goals (the pathways component of hope), for example by
means of interventions as outlined by Snyder (1995) or cognitive-
behavioral techniques (Beck et al., 1979). Further, treatments for
depression should also be evaluated in terms of their impact on
hope.
Some limitations of this study should be noted. The cross-
sectional design of the study prevents causal inferences about
the observed relationships. Future studies may use longitudinal
designs to investigate the temporal relationships between depres-
sion, hope, expectations, and the initiation and execution of
actions. In addition, with the methodology used in the present
study, the accuracy of the participants’ estimates could not be
assessed (cf. MacLeod, 1999; Harris and Hahn, 2011). However,
findings from other studies (e.g., Strunk et al., 2006) suggest
that the expectations of depressed individuals are not only pes-
simistic, but also unrealistic. Finally, as only mood disorders and
psychotic symptoms were assessed in the participants, the effects
of other psychological disorders often comorbid with depression
(e.g., anxiety or obsessive-compulsive disorder) could not be
examined.
In summary, the results of the present study give support
to existing knowledge about hope and probability estimates of
future events in clinically depressed and non-depressed indi-
viduals with clinically depressed being more hopeless and hav-
ing less positive and more negative expectations for the future.
The current investigation contributes with new findings about
previously depressed individuals. Previously depressed showed
reduced hope, but differed not from never depressed in their
estimates for the probability of future events.
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